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1. Introduction 
The task of nation-building that has occurred during the 23 years since the fall of the 
Soviet Union created conditions wherein Russia’s relationship with the West has run the 
spectrum from ally to adversary, contributing to an ever challenging policy environment. Russian 
foreign policy decisions are a perplexing combination of residual relationships from the Cold 
War (Syria, Iran) and projections of power in its Near Abroad
1
 (Georgia, Ukraine), while 
Russian domestic policy is often haphazard and contradictory to Russia’s needs. This is 
especially clear in domestic policy towards immigration.  
Russia is in the midst of a demographic crisis that has seen its population shrink by seven 
million people in just over 20 years due to the combined influence of a low birth rate, 
temporarily high mortality rate, and emigration (Judah, 2013). Had it not been for the 
approximately 12 million migrants (MPC, 2013) over the same period – largely from CIS 
countries – the proportion of the crisis would be significantly worse. Projecting forward, the 
World Bank estimates that the combination of low birth rates and an aging population will lead 
to a labor shortage of approximately 25 million workers by 2050. (World Bank, 2011). The 
Russian government has identified this as the chief economic threat to national security 
(Molchanov, 2013), yet the severity of the crisis has not led to proper policy solutions, a 
reflection of the current challenges within Russia; challenges intertwined with Russia’s post-
Soviet identity.  
                                                 
1
 A Russo-centric term that comprises much of the former Soviet Union. 
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An examination of Russian immigration policy provides a lens through which a better 
understanding of Russian actions can be viewed. Russian dependence on immigration for 
population growth and stability cannot be understated: when migration flows dropped in between 
2001-2006, natural population decline increased and total population growth fell (MPC, 2013). 
Migration policy – with specific regards to labor migrants from former CIS countries in Central 
Asia – will significantly influence the future of Russia. As such, migration policy involves and 
affects nearly every aspect of Russian society and politics. While this paper touches on these 
areas, it is not a thorough examination of such interconnectedness. Rather, this paper will 
examine Russian migration policy from its genesis to its current form, highlighting influential 
legislation that has made a lasting impact. Such legislation reflects the dynamics of the Russian 
political system; therefore, an analysis of the system that has increasingly supported an ethnic 
definition of Russia as engineered by the presidency of Vladimir Putin is warranted. Combined, 
this background informs an analysis of the State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation to 
2025 (SMPRF), the most recent attempt at reforming migration policy.  
1.1 Problem Definition 
There are approximately 8.9 million migrants working in Russia, comprising 
approximately 11% of the workforce.
2
  Of this total, 2.9 million hold official work permits, a 
necessary component to legal employment in Russia (OECD, 2014): A cumbersome, highly 
bureaucratic process that most migrants avoid. Thus, the remaining 6 million migrants work 
outside of legal channels, earning a tax-free, cash wage that is often a fraction of what legally 
registered workers receive. By pushing both employers and labor migrants to the margins of 
                                                 
2
 This estimation is based on official statistics indication 2.9 million registered migrant workers, combined with an 
OECD estimate of 6 million irregular (or unregistered) migrant workers. Other sources estimate a range between 3 
million and 10 million unregistered migrants working in Russia.  
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legality, Russian migration policy can be seen as a failure, effectively increasing the number of 
irregular migrants working in the country. The challenge for Russia involves untangling a 
contradictory policy arena that both supports and opposes migrant labor. Rhetorically, Russia 
supports policy alternatives increasing the ability of migrants to work freely in Russia. This 
signifies an official recognition of the importance migrant labor plays in the economy and the 
importance of bringing migrants into the fold of regulated labor. However, such recognition is 
seemingly limited to mere rhetoric given the adoption of myriad laws imposing increasingly 
strict conditions pertaining to migrant labor. These laws – often supported by an increasingly 
xenophobic public – maintain the status quo: an underground labor economy exploited by 
employers.  
 The policy environment is increasingly challenged by the dominance of ethnic 
nationalism over civic nationalism in competition for Russia’s post-Soviet identity; a dominance 
that has paralleled the rise of Russian President Vladimir Putin and the increasing influence of 
the Russian Orthodox Church. In broad terms, ethnic nationalism is equated with “Russia for the 
Russians,” a concept that supports limiting citizenship to ethnic Russians.3 Endemic to this 
concept is a determination of what defines an ethnic Russian, a largely (perhaps intentionally) 
undefined category. In contrast, civic nationalism involves a Russian state that encompasses a 
diverse population united through shared cultural norms and values; a concept largely equated 
with the failure of Western reforms following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  
1.2 Irregular vs. Illegal  
                                                 
3
 Debate ranges within Russia over what defines an ethnic Russian, a complex issue that draws upon Russia’s 
experience as a multi-ethnic society. One could argue that defining what comprises an ethnic Russian is endemic to 
the challenges this paper presents. For the purpose of distinguishing population groups, I define ethnic Russians as 
Slavic citizens of the Russian federation. In using this definition, I am not making a normative statement, nor do I 
claim to solve the current debate. This distinction is merely a necessary component of discussing ethnic nationalism 
in Russia; a distinction that omits Russian citizens of non-Slavic descent. 
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For the purpose of my discussion, I use the term irregular when discussing labor 
migrants. With respect to the receiving country, the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) defines irregular migration as “entry, stay, or work in a country without the necessary 
authorization or documents required under immigration regulations” (IOM, 2014). The 
documents in question are either work permits or patents, two forms of licensing required by the 
Russian Federation. This is preferred over illegal labor migration given the pejorative weight 
behind the word illegal. Furthermore, irregular labor migration better describes conditions in 
Russia given that the majority of migrants are entering legally from CIS countries where visa 
requirements (for entering Russia) are waived.
4
  
2. The Migrants 
 Understanding modern Russian migration involves a grasp of a new center-periphery 
relationship that dominates Russian society and politics. The breakup of the Soviet Union 
presented a number of challenges for its former republics, specifically those located in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus. For a short time, independence from the Soviet Union and integration 
with the world community ruled the day, prompting migration outflows 
5
 that included the return 
of ethnic Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, and other Central Asians from Russia to their newly 
independent countries. Despite a wave of repatriation to ethnic homelands and a tumultuous 
economic situation, Russia remained both the regional hegemon and the dominant economic 
power and maintained de facto control of the newly independent republics. 
 Twenty-three years later, the reality of Russian dominance affects the daily lives of the 
                                                 
4
 Legal entry without a visa is controlled at border crossings and limits migrants to a 90 day stay in Russia every 180 
days—a condition indicated on a foreign national’s passport. Given the length of the Russian border and the 
irregularity of data collection, existing numbers for irregular migrants are estimates. 
5
 According to ROSSTAT, the top destinations for Russian emigrants in the early 90s were Germany, Israel, and the 
United States.  
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former Soviet republics. Independence did not provide prosperity or security, and Russia has 
become increasingly involved in providing both economic opportunities and national security. 
Within the economic sphere, Russia is the top import market in both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 
and second only to China in the Kyrgyz Republic (CIA, 2014). Russian dominance of the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) guarantees Russian involvement in military 
affairs while the prospect of admission into the Eurasian Customs Union (including Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Armenia) encourages the perpetuation of economic terms largely 
favorable to Russia. Furthermore, democratic elections have served largely to legitimize one-
party, semi-authoritarian rule.
6
 This concentration of power has done little to modernize these 
countries and subsequently provide opportunities for their citizens. Accordingly, many persons 
from Central Asian countries – who twenty years previously would have been Soviet citizens – 
have become economic migrants, seeking opportunity in Russia.  
2.1 Who are they? 
482,241 migrants were officially granted temporary or permanent residency permits in 2013 
(ROSSTAT, 2014). Of this number, 87% were from CIS countries; 48% from the former Soviet 
Central Asian states (figure 1, below).  
                                                 
6
 For example, the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have been in power since 1990. Tajikistan fares better: 
President Emomahli Rahmon has been in power since 1994.  
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Irregular migrant labor comprises a larger figure: the OECD states that approximately 6 million 
migrants working irregularly in Russia,
7
 with approximately 80% of these individuals emigrating 
from the Central Asian countries of the CIS, including Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan 
(OECD, 2012). Migrants from these countries travel to Russia in search of labor and are 
typically young males who have very low levels of knowledge of Russian language, few skills, 
and no knowledge of Russian laws, rules, and norms (MPC, 2014).  
2.2 What do they do? 
Irregular labor migrants in Russia are typically employed in the least regulated jobs, 
including retail work, services, manufacturing, agriculture, and construction (Metelev, 2014), 
often without the benefit of a contract or formal agreement (Iontsev & Ivakhnyuk, 2013). Despite 
an increase in unemployment resulting from the 2008 global economic crisis, these jobs have 
been eschewed by Russian citizens, who prefer unemployment over the stigma of working as a 
construction worker or laborer (Iontsev & Ivakhnyuk, 2012). Accordingly, migrant workers do 
                                                 
7
 Typically, irregular labor is measured as a residual number taken from the total number of foreign born persons 
living in Russia, last recorded in 2002. Subtracted from this number are annual figures including individuals with 
work permits, temporary residents and guests, and patent holders. These leads to a “best guess” of irregular labor 
that can vary from year to year and from official to official. The OECD figure of 6 million should be considered a 
fair estimate, given that various sources cited in this paper quoted figures ranging from 3 -11 million irregular labor 
migrants.  
Skapyak 10 
 
not report competition from Russian citizens as negatively impacting their job prospects (ibid.)  
 
Source: ROSSTAT (2007)  
 An important recent trend involves the employment of female irregular migrants. As of 
2012, approximately 2/3 of all female irregular migrants were employed by individuals in the 
personal care sector (Iontsev & Ivakhnyuk, 2012). The presence of female migrants is in 
accordance with a broader trend indicating increased female labor migration, as distinct from 
migration for reunification or lifestyle migration (Hanlon & Vicino, 2014). Like their male 
counterparts, female migrants tend to be isolated to certain industries, particularly those related 
to domestic service, childcare, and eldercare.  
2.3 Why migrate to Russia? 
 A number of conditions make Russia a favorable destination for labor migrants. 
Primarily, a visa exception for persons from CIS countries makes entry into Russia an easy 
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process.
8
 Additionally, stagnant economic growth within CIS countries has limited the growth of 
real wages, making Russia an attractive destination (table 1, below).  
   Table 1: Comparison of economic conditions between select CIS countries 
Country Unemployment, 2013 Average Monthly Wage, 
2013 (USD) 
Kyrgyz Republic    8.3% $262 
Russian Federation 5.5% $912 
Tajikistan --- $200 
Uzbekistan 4.9 $300 
             Source: Interstate Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 2013 
At the same time, high prices for both oil and hydrocarbons have fostered an economic boom in 
Russia. With specific regard to Moscow and St. Petersburg,
9
 both cities are experiencing labor 
shortages in the low-skilled sectors that have traditionally attracted labor migrants (Metelev, 
2014). These circumstances are likely to be affected by the international sanctions related to 
Russia’s role in fostering conflict in eastern Ukraine and decrease in prices for hydrocarbon and 
petroleum exports; however, labor migrants have become a structural aspect of the Russian 
economy (Korobkov, 2008) and, while a downturn can be expected, such conditions will not 
affect the flow of migrants to Russia. The Russian experience during the 2008 economic crisis 
exhibited the resilience of the demand for irregular labor: estimates by the IOM indicate that the 
highly segmented nature of irregular labor left it largely unaffected during the economic 
slowdown (IOM, 2009). Additionally, while government data showed a decline in formally 
employed foreign workers during the 2008 economic crisis, remittances to home countries 
during this same period increased, illustrating an increase in irregular labor (IOM, 2014). 
                                                 
8
 In contrast, the process for getting a travel or work visa is complex, requiring significant paperwork that further 
involves mailing a passport to a Russian counsel. Additional requirements, including an HIV test and criminal 
background check, may be required depending on the type of visa and duration of stay.  
9
 It is estimated that 50% of labor migrants travel to either Moscow or St. Petersburg.  
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Ultimately, a slowdown in Russia is more likely to affect sending countries by disrupting trade 
and investment, causing economic strife that could lead to increased unemployment and 
ultimately increasing the number of labor migrants traveling to Russia.  
 The existence of a strong Central Asian diaspora also makes Russia an attractive 
destination. Diasporas often assume the role of informal migration services, providing newly-
arrived migrants help in finding employment and housing. Additionally, where confusing and 
arcane migration laws exist (as in Russia), diasporas become the semi-official source for 
information for newly arrived labor migrants (Iontsev & Ivakhnyuk, 2013). In some cases, the 
draw of the diaspora group becomes so strong that ethnic enclaves develop, ostensibly limiting 
the need for migrants to integrate into Russian society (Molchanov, 2013). 
2.4. Migrant Perceptions 
 Within the Russian Federation, migrants are largely viewed as individuals who have 
traveled to Russia to earn money; however, such a definition negatively equates migrant with 
individuals occupying the lowest rungs of Russian society (Abashin, 2013).  Migrants are 
portrayed as significantly undercutting the domestic labor market due to the significantly lower 
wages paid to migrants, a condition that creates the perception of a significant rivalry between 
ethnic Russians and migrants. This perception is misleading: migrant workers have been shown 
to have a minimal effect on job numbers within Russia (Karpova & Vorona, 2014). Despite 
statistics indicating otherwise (Interfax, 2013), migrants are also believed to increase overall 
crime rates. When crimes do occur, the Russian media focuses on the ethnic differences between 
migrants and Russians as a major factor. An example of this involves the October 2013 murder 
of an ethnic Russian by an Azerbaijani migrant. Following the arrest, the Russian media focused 
on presenting the suspect as “aggressive, hot-tempered, and an abuser of alcohol with no 
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permanent address” (Herszenhorn, 2013), and highlighted the lack of integration of Azerbaijani 
migrants in the southwest Moscow suburb of Biryulyovo. This became a continuous thread 
throughout Russian media, leading to interviews with (Russian) Biryulyovo residents who 
recounted numerous incidents of the lawlessness of the migrants living and working in the 
suburb (despite a lack of evidence). Ultimately, this perpetuated a stereotype that encouraged 
nationalist sympathies and further contributed to the continuation of difficult circumstances for 
migrant populations within Russia. 
3. Migration Policy in Russia 
 Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian migration policy has worked through a 
number of iterations, from initial support for migrants to increased securitization in accordance 
with a popular view of migration as a problem. The result is a policy beset with contradictions 
and inconsistency between demographic needs and federal migration policy (Riazantsev, 2013).  
3.1 History 
In the period immediately following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, migration policy 
focused on creating conditions favorable for the return of the ethnic Russian diaspora scattered 
throughout the now independent Soviet republics. This led to the granting of visa-free travel 
between members of the newly-formed Commonwealth of Independent States,
10
 the primary 
condition that allows irregular migration to flourish (MPC, 2013). Estimates from the period 
between 1993 and 2001 show that more than 13 million individuals were repatriated into Russia, 
a majority of whom were ethnic Russians (ibid). At this time, virtually no support or integration 
programs were in place, given a common language, relatively high levels of education, and 
                                                 
10
 The omission of the Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania from this provision has created an alternative migration 
challenge for Russians living in these countries, wherein they currently have no official status and as a result face 
extreme difficulties in securing exit visas. 
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transferrable skill sets learned under Soviet rule (MPC, 2014).  
At the same time, little consideration for labor migration and its potential impact were 
made. Three conditions were largely responsible for the lack of attention to labor migration. 
First, the post-Soviet economic crisis limited both economic opportuinty in Russia and decreased 
its attractiveness as a destination for migrants. Second, following the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, gaining Russian citizenship was a simple process: former citizens of the Soviet Union 
residing outside of the Russian Federation could become citizens by filling out a simple form 
(Lohr, 2012). Moreover, such encouragement was supported by tolerance and acceptance of 
dual-citizenship with the independent republics (ibid), although this proved to be largely one-
sided (on behalf of the Russians). Finally, the initial wave of migrants were largely 
indistinguishable in both appearance and in language, two factors that often prevent integration 
in Russian society. As such, these individuals were often perceived as fellow Soviet citizens, 
rather than Belorussians or Ukranians (MPC, 2014).   
The Federal Migration Service (FMS) was founded in 1992 under the concept of assisting 
migrants and refugees with finding employment and housing (Flynn, 2004). Institutionalized 
support quickly waned in accordance with a gradual reversal of the hertofore liberal attitude 
towards migration, with the touchstone for securitization being the first Chechen War (1994-96). 
From this point on, the mission of the FMS changed from a supportive to a restrictive role, 
stating that “uncontrollable migration is acquiring a threatening character, aggravating the 
epidemiological, criminal, and socials situation in major cities, and causing harm to the security 
of the country” (Robarts, 2008). Thus, the FMS became increasingly involved in controlling and 
limiting migration flows into the Russian Federation via increased policing and deportation and a 
gradual rollback of liberal migration policies leading to significant reforms in 2002. 
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Reforms 
 In 2002, Russia revised its citizenship law allowing only former Soviet citizens who had 
lived within the borders of the Russian federation access to Russian citizenship through the 
simplified procedure. In addition, new laws were created distinguishing foreign citizens and 
stateless persons, further establishing three legal categories and corresponding permits
11
 for their 
stay on Russian territory: 1. Temporary sojourning foreign citizens, which grants up to a 90 day 
stay in Russia without a visa; 2. Temporary resident foreign citizens, a category requiring  
foreign nationals to hold a non-renewable permit authorizing residency in Russia for up to three 
years; 3. Permanent resident foreign citizens, a category requiring foreign nationals to hold a 
renewable permit authorizing residency in Russia for up to five years (Abashin, 2013; FMS, 
2014). Citizenship requirements become more stringent as well: former Soviet citizens that had 
not resided in Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union now had to provide evidence of a legal 
source of income, renounce their previous citizenship, and demonstrate proficiency in the 
Russian language (Shevel, 2011a). The impetus behind this revision was a belief that the liberal 
naturalization process was creating two crises: a national security crisis involving the 
naturalization of criminals, and an economic crisis relating to the increased burden on the state 
economy (once newly naturalized individuals reached pension age). In addition, it was argued 
that the predominantly Muslim migrants from Central Asia posed a security threat; an argument 
that conveniently grouped all Central Asian migrants into a monolith supportive of Islamic 
extremism. 
 In 2002, the FMS was absorbed into the Ministry of Internal Affairs, creating a vertical 
power structure with a direct line to the office of president. Decisions related to migration policy 
                                                 
11
 And corresponding visa requirements.  
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became highly influenced by presidential initiatives, a condition that allowed for the 
manipulation of policy to garner favorable public opinion. Thus, as concerns over terrorism rose 
in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, the president was able to 
rapidly affect legislation that increased the restrictions for migrant inflow, buttressing his support 
amongst the population.  
 Such changes also mark a distinct change in the development of Russia’s post-Soviet 
identity, from a support of civic nationalism to a support for ethnic nationalism. Such conditions 
were not unique to Russia. Increasingly, multiculturalism in was viewed in some European 
countries as having weakened national cultures and identities. This factor, when coupled with the 
prevalence of security politics following 9/11, caused countries to turn to nationalist policy 
solutions as a means of cultural renewal (Kostakopoulou, 2014). Accordingly, within Russia, the 
definition of Russian was called into question and a set in motion a process that significantly 
narrowed the definition from a non-ethnic territorial delineation to a largely ethnic definition. 
Restricting citizenship appealed to the increasingly ethnic nationalist tendencies within Russia, 
yet it also limited the means by which Russia could support population groups outside of Russia 
by offering citizenship: a significant constraint on Russia’s ability to unilaterally intervene in its 
near abroad. From 2003- 2010, a series of amendments to the citizenship law were made 
including provisions to support veterans of both Russian and Soviet armies and individuals that 
received higher education in Russia. These amendments maintained support for ethnic 
nationalism, serving as a filter that allowed the government keep undesirable populations on the 
margins of Russia, while liberalizing naturalization for persons it felt were a benefit to society 
(Lohr, 2012). Subsequent amendments would support the naturalization of persons outside of 
Russia and serve as a bedrock for Russia’s behavior in the near abroad in the subsequent years.  
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4. Current Policy 
 The result of 20 years of amendments and revisions has left Russian migration policy a 
confusing tangle of contradictions and anachronisms. Current policy is a blend of laws that 
support desired populations, including the recent attempt to attract individuals with high 
technical ability
12
 for permanent settlement in Russia by offering a series of incentives and 
benefits. These supportive policies come at the expense of migrant populations facing an 
increasingly restrictive policy environment that makes conditions for low-skilled labor migrants 
difficult and confusing. Russia has considered this increased securitization necessary for 
protecting both the economic and physical security of its citizens. While it’s true that Russia 
needs such high-skilled individuals, such one-sided focus belies the demographic reality that 
Russia faces in the coming years. Additionally, throughout myriad iterations of migration policy, 
Russia has maintained its open border practice with CIS countries, the main condition allowing 
irregular migrants into Russia.  
4.1 Quota System 
The process for obtaining a temporary work permit is a multi-stage, highly bureaucratic 
affair. Labor migrants must first register their residence with the FMS, a condition that grants a 
90 day permit to stay in Russia. Following this, migrants can apply for a work permit with the 
FMS provided they have the proper documentation package.
13
 Assuming the process is approved 
quickly, this grants a worker less than 90 days of legal employment in country. However, work 
permits are viewed as one component of the real goal: a temporary residency permit granting the 
holder the right to stay in Russia for up to three years.  Temporary residency does not, however, 
                                                 
12
 Civic engineers top the list.  
13
 Comprised of a passport-sized photo, migration card, and identification from the migrant’s home country, and a 
receipt showing that a 1,000 ruble fee was paid. 
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automatically extend a work permit – doing so requires returning to the FMS to apply for a 1-
year extension on a work permit. All totaled, migrants seeking both work permits and temporary 
residency can expect a minimum of four trips to a FMS office.  
  In a given year, the number of total permits is based on a quota system determined solely 
by Russian employers who apply for permits in the preceding year. Separate quotas are 
established for citizens of the CIS and foreign citizens in general, with the majority of permits 
allotted for the former. Additionally, quotas are assigned for low-skilled labor, while high-
skilled, desired populations are exempt via an annual list of professions that are not subjected to 
the quota. In 2014, 1,631,586 quotas were allotted by the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Protection. The number of quotas fluctuates from year to year, but has steadily decreased since 
2009 (see figure 3, below).  
While normally the purview of Russian businesses, in 2007, the Russian government 
intervened in the quota assignment process, arbitrarily assigning a quota of 6 million work 
permits. While it is unclear whether all 6 million permits were distributed, the result of such a 
high number meant that, in 2008, business leaders did submit applications, expecting a similar 
number. As a result, the 2008 quota was set at 1.5 million, a figure below the actual number of 
registered workers in 2007 (Iontsev & Ivakhnyuk, 2012). Government intervention in the quota 
system occurred again in 2009 when, under pressure from protests against the hiring of foreign 
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workers, then Prime Minister Putin suggested that the 2009 quota (set at 4 million permits) 
should be halved. The government quickly followed suit, passing legislation granting the 
government the authority to modify quotas after the annual allocation was set (IOM, 2009). 
Enforcement of laws pertaining to temporary work permits is the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Interior (MOI), following its officially designated responsibilities to control the 
prevention of illegal migration (Robarts, 2008). Foreign nationals found working without a 
permit face deportation and a possible three year ban on reentry to Russia (FMS, 2012). In 2013, 
the FMS (now a division of the MOI) reported deporting 82,413 individuals. Mass enforcement 
events are more likely to occur than routine incidents, due to the structural importance migrant 
labor plays in the Russian economy. These events are often used by political elites to bolster 
support around elections by appealing to nationalist sentiments. In the 2013 mayoral campaign, 
incumbent mayor Sergei Sobyanin boasted of having cleansed the city of illegal immigrants and 
created a Potemkin camp of “arrested” irregular migrants awaiting deportation outside of 
Moscow (Judah, 2013). Employers found using irregular labor are subject to fines and 
imprisonment (Obrazkova, 2013); however, under normal circumstances, enforcement can be 
considered lackluster at best: corruption within the official ranks allows business leaders, reliant 
on cheap migrant labor, to bribe FMS and police officials to turn a blind eye to irregular migrant 
labor.  
4.4 Serfdom 2.0 
 Despite poor working conditions, a paternalistic relationship develops between 
employers and employees that maintains the loyalty of migrant workers. For those holding work 
permits, this is the result of federal regulations that link permit holders to a specific employer, a 
condition that makes changing jobs difficult. For irregular laborers, the employer is seen as the 
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protector-benefactor of migrant workers, defending them from the prosecution by the police and 
deportation by the FMS (Metelev, 2014). Migrants fear that, by asking for too much or 
complaining too loudly, they risk losing favor with an employer who could easily turn them over 
to the FMS. In return, employers exploit irregular labor, paying migrants 80% less than their 
Russian counterparts (Judah, 2013). Additionally, the lack of organized labor among migrant 
workers – even those holding work permits – means that employers are not beholden to 
workplace standards regarding both physical and psychological treatment of employees.  
4.5 Diasporas 
Rather than following official channels, migrants in Russia often turn to diasporas to 
fulfill their needs. In turn, diasporas maintain a steady stream of labor that is often exploited in a 
manner similar to their ethnic Russian counterparts. The reliance on diasporas has led to a 
perception of enclavization wherein officials believe that migrant groups eschew any attempts at 
broader integration preferring to become a society within a society, where only the broadest 
Russian laws apply and knowledge of the Russian language is not a prerequisite for daily 
business. These enclaves often pop up in lower class suburbs of large cities; suburbs which tend 
to have high unemployment (among Russian citizens) and a citizen base resentful of migrants for 
what they perceive as preferential treatment from the government. This low-simmering 
resentment is often exploited by nationalist groups to bolster their ranks. This nationalist 
sentiment, often in line with the concept of “Russia for the Russians,” is one of two competing 
frameworks dominating Russia’s post-Soviet concept of state.  
4.2 Compatriot Act 
In describing the breakup of the Soviet Union, President Putin described the “drama” that 
“tens of millions of our co-citizens and compatriots found themselves outside Russian territory” 
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(BBC, 2005; Panov, 2010). In response, legislation was enacted that would allow Russia to 
support persons outside of the country. The “State Policy of the Russian Federation on 
Compatriots Abroad” (Compatriots Act) amended a 1999 law14 that had previously designated 
compatriots as persons born outside of the Russian Federation, but share similar language, 
culture, and religion (Shevel, 2011b). While this original legislation was abolished with the 2002 
amendments to naturalization policy, it was resurrected in 2007 in support of the Compatriots 
Resettlement Act, an effort that provided a robust support system to qualified migrants willing to 
be resettled in priority areas. In 2008, the new Compatriots Act included provisions for 
simplified naturalization in tune with the liberal policies of the 90s. In 2010, the law was further 
amended to include language defining compatriots as persons that make a conscious decision in 
favor of Russian cultural traditions or are related to ethnicities that have traditionally resided on 
the territory of the Russian Federation. The opacity of the amended law is seen by some as 
intentional vagueness that provides a broad definition of compatriot (Iontsev & Ivakhnyuk, 2013; 
Lohr, 2012; Shevel, 2011b). Moreover, by intentionally withholding definitions of culture, 
language, and ethnicity from all versions of the Compatriot Act, Russia has legal cover to define 
nearly any population group as a compatriot and act in accordance with foreign policy goals.  
 5.0 Redefining the Russian State  
 The changing landscape of Russian policy towards migration reflects the shifting attitude 
surrounding Russia’s post-Soviet identity. The challenge in the immediate aftermath was viewed 
as the need to move beyond communism; a challenge that was met by embracing Western 
concepts of civic nationalism. Tied to this concept were expectations that, by embracing Western 
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 Specifically, this was an attempt by the Duma to circumvent the rejection of dual-citizenship proposals between 
Russia and several former CIS countries. 
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concepts, Russia would reap economic rewards. When these rewards proved elusive, blame was 
cast on the Western reforms as being foreign to Russian ideals.  
5.1 Civic Nationalism in Russia 
 Defining a country in terms of civic nationalism involves a recognition that all persons 
living within the borders of a country can be included as citizens (Muller, 2008). Embracing this 
definition in the Russian Federation paralleled the adoption en masse of economic, political, and 
societal reforms often categorized under the label of liberalism. Post communism, such reform 
was supported by society at large and political elites
15
 who considered supporting the antithesis 
of communism as the chief means to promote the development of Russia. The inclusiveness of 
civic nationalism marks the period of open migration and simplified citizenship that 
distinguished the initial post-Soviet citizenship laws (Robarts, 2008). Such openness was 
seemingly short lived. The First Chechen war (1994-96) initiated a wave of securitization, 
supported by a public that increasingly believed that migrants – particularly those from Central 
Asia and the Caucuses – were sympathetic to the Islamic extremism thought intrinsic to the war 
in Chechnya. At the same time, Russia was entering a protracted economic crisis. Combined, 
these conditions lead to the erosion of public support for the liberalization of Russia in 
accordance with Western norms. Additionally, Russians became increasingly strident in their 
belief that the Russian nationality was the titular nationality, pointing to the legal recognition of 
Russian as the official language and the use of the nationality Russian in the official country 
name (Khazanov, 1997). Under these circumstances the inevitable rise of ethnic nationalism can 
be viewed.  
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 Not in total, as exemplified first by the coup attempts of the early 90s and the continued presence of the 
Communist party within Russian politics.  
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5.2 Ethnic Nationalism 
 Ethnic nationalism involves a selective view of citizenship, with key elements including 
shared heritage, language, and a common faith (Muller, 2008). The perceived failure of Western 
reforms (supported by civic nationalism), and the move towards an ethnic identity led to the 
rejection of the West and a turn to the development of a “Russian” way that would draw heavily 
upon the shared heritage surrounding Russian ethnicity, collective identification as “Russian,” 
and the shared religious heritage of the Russian Orthodox Church (Khazanov, 1997). Support 
was mustered by the assertion that unfettered migration diluted Russian culture and further 
hastened the loss of traditional values in accordance with the long-waning influence of the 
Orthodox Church (Peregudov, 2014).  
 The rise of ethnic nationalism was further facilitated by an ideological vacuum left after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. While western proponents of civic nationalism focused on 
dismantling the remnants of Soviet symbols and practices, there was no ideological replacement 
to unite the public. When the pendulum shifted, ethnic nationalism filled this void by returning to 
a historical narrative of Russia’s special course or divine role in the world order. Filling this void 
was a necessary requirement in rebuilding the psyche of the Russian population. The 
pervasiveness of Soviet propaganda in proclaiming the importance of the Soviet Union in 
international affairs (as an alternative to the Western democracy) and in promoting and 
protecting communist regimes across the world had created a sense of importance amongst the 
Russian people. When communism collapsed, the near immediate loss of Russian power in 
international affairs combined with a lack of economic opportunity created a strong feeling of 
humiliation pervasive throughout the Russian Federation (Khazanov, 1997). Without the central 
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role of the state, individuals turned to ethnic groupings for solidarity and enmity (Muller, 2008) 
and reinvented the mythology of the Russian ethnicity. Concurrent to this movement was the rise 
of Vladimir Putin.  
5.3 Putin and Ethnic Nationalism 
 Prior to his election in 2000, Vladimir Putin offered three pillars on which the Russia 
state should stand, namely patriotism, power, and statism (Cannady & Kubicek, 2014). Inasmuch 
as these pillars proved successful during the election campaign, they also served as an attempt to 
counter the feelings of national inadequacy that plagued Russia following the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union. Furthermore, these three pillars are a common theme throughout Putin’s three 
terms as president: in particular, the concept of statism, or the belief that the state should have 
significant influence in a society and economy, supports much of the vertical restructuring of 
power that has accompanied Putin’s rule. In addition, patriotism involves a sense of pride in 
Russian historic accomplishments and institutions, none of which have been more important than 
the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) of whom Putin has stated “is a symbol of the rebirth and 
reunification of the Russian people”(Cannady & Kubicek, 2014). Reconstructing the tight-knit 
relationship between the ROC and the Russian government creates a symbiotic relationship: the 
ROC grants the state legitimacy by supporting state-favored candidates, while the ROC is 
granted legitimacy through its position as the unofficial state religion
16
 (Gaskova, 2004). In 
support of this, the U.S. Department of State (2013) reports that: 
Despite a constitutional separation of church and state, in practice the government 
cooperated more closely with the ROC than with other religious organizations. The ROC 
had a number of formal and informal agreements with government ministries giving it 
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 In November, 2013, a proposal to grant the Russian Orthodox Church a “special role” was presented to the Duma 
for debate. To date, no further action has been taken on this proposal. 
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greater access than other religious organizations to public institutions such as schools, 
hospitals, prisons, police, and the military forces. The government also provided the 
Russian Orthodox patriarch with security guards and access to official vehicles, a 
privilege accorded no other religious organization. 
This provides the ROC with the ability to influence policy outcomes favorable to their position 
in society, including a special provision making the ROC the only religious organization allowed 
to review draft legislation before the State Duma (U.S. Department of State, 2013). The ROC has 
used this power to limit non-native churches from purchasing land and or receiving building 
permits, an important consideration given the potential of a population shift that would see the 
Islamic population increase 20% by 2020 (Light, 2012). Furthermore, the liberal policies of the 
90s were correlated with the waning influence of the ROC and the overall deterioration of living 
conditions. Embracing the ROC is viewed as embracing a return to the values that once drove the 
country to greatness; a mythologizing that requires defining Russia under ethnic terms.  
Support for ethnic nationalism remains a pillar of Putin’s Russia; however, the reality of 
the multi-ethnic nature of Russian society is increasingly unavoidable. In his article, “Russia: 
The Ethnic Issue,” Putin laid the foundation for the duplicitous attitude towards migrants that 
exists today, outlining the importance of a modern migration policy for the preservation of a 
multi-ethnic society while also claiming a special place for ethnic Russians, Russian culture, and 
Russian language as the glue that holds society together. Further supporting this assertion, Putin 
claims that “The civilizational identity of the Russian federation is based on the preservation of 
Russian cultural dominance”(Putin, 2012). The nature of the address is less about finding mutual 
ground and creating an inclusive, multi-national Russian society as it is an attempt at curtailing 
the rising xenophobia within Russia that accompanies support for ethnic nationalism. Regardless, 
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the address illustrates the current circumstance wherein control over migration policy rests in the 
hands of one person; a person who’s ties to the ROC and ethnic groups prevents a modern 
migration policy in line with Russia’s demographic situation.  
6. The 2025 Concept and the Failure of Reform 
 The State Migration policy concept of the Russian Federation to 2025
17
 (SMPRF) is a 
strategic document created by a government commission (decreed by an executive order). The 
document is an attempt to address the coming demographic crisis through maintaining national 
security, stabilizing and increasing the resident population of the Russian Federation, and 
modernizing the Russian economy. Implementation of the migration policy would be achieved in 
three stages: an active stage (2012-2015), a monitoring stage (2016-2020); and an assessment 
stage (2021-2025). While the document itself is not law, approval by the president gives the 
objectives within the document priority stature within the Russian policy process and further 
ensures that presidential oversight will be frequent and robust. 
Official statements outline the document’s recognition of migration as “an important part 
of the social, economic, and demographic policy of the Russian Federation” (Egorova, 2012); 
however, analysis of the document and subsequent passage of laws surrounding the document 
illustrate the influence ethnic nationalism continues to have on Russian migration policy.  
The specificities of reform are outlined in section III, 23 of the SMPRF. The seven key 
directives are outlined below: 
1. Creation of conditions and incentives for the relocation of the compatriots and emigrants living abroad and 
certain categories of foreign nationals for permanent residence in the Russian Federation 
2. Development of different means to attract, select, and use foreign labor 
3. Promotion of internal migration 
4. Promotion of educational migration and support for academic mobility 
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5. Implementation of humanitarian obligations for forced migrants 
6. Promotion of adaptation and integration of migrants and the formation of constructive interaction between 
migrants and the host community 
7. Combatting illegal migration 
 
Remarkably, the document focuses not on easing conditions for migrant labor – which 
would immediately impact the demographic crisis – but on attracting the right kind of migrants: 
highly educated specialists, entrepreneurs, investors, compatriots, and emigrants. Such 
conditions are an attempt to both stem the demographic crisis and provide the Russian economy 
with the professions necessary to carry out the modernization the Russian economy requires to 
remain competitive as a global market; a competitiveness that has seen Russia fall behind fellow 
members of the BRIC nations due in large part to its lack of economic diversity and reliance on 
energy exports.  
In determining the success of the policy at the tail-end of the active stage, the below 
analysis will focus on four areas of the SMPRF: resettlement support, infrastructure 
development, integration assistance, and illegal migration. Determining the success of the 
SMPRF focuses on 16 constitutional amendments
18
 related to migration passed subsequent to the 
presidential approval (of the SMPRF), and their ability substantially alter the composition of 
Russian migration law.  
6.1 Resettlement Support (Section III, 24, a) 
 The vague nature of the compatriot act (see 4.2) can be viewed as justification for 
Russian military intervention under the auspice of protecting individuals abroad. In this section 
of the SMPRF, compatriot is broadly defined as anyone the Russian Federation deems as 
valuable for the development of the country. This includes ethnic Russians and emigrants, 
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186,000 of whom emigrated from Russia in 2013 (BBC, 2014). The reasons for emigration vary 
among population groups: entrepreneurs leave due to endemic corruption and layers of 
bureaucracy; youth leave to pursue higher education; families leave for better healthcare and 
schools (de Carbonnel, 2014). Accordingly, the SMPRF’s intent is not to attract a enough 
compatriots to offset demographic losses; instead it is an attempt to encourage the return of the 
types of professionals that would contribute directly to the diversification and modernization of 
the economy (de Carbonnel, 2014). As outlined by the SMPRF, these individuals fall into one of 
several categories: qualified professionals, graduates of Russian educational institutions, and 
young people with special demand on the Russian labor market. In addition to offering these 
individuals an incentive package,
19
 qualified individuals are also afforded simplified citizenship 
procedure. The qualifications for “preferred status” largely excludes migrants from Central Asia 
due to their lack of skills.  
Of the 16 total amendments supporting the SMPRF, 25% support easing the resettlement 
of compatriots. Two amendments passed in 2014
20
 are noteworthy for their application to foreign 
affairs, specifically the 2014 annexation of Crimea. These amendments both ease the conditions 
wherein foreign citizens and stateless persons living on Russian territory are granted citizenship. 
Applied to Crimea, such conditions offer a smooth transition to Russian citizenship within the 
newly annexed territory. This application of migration-related law to Russia’s near abroad 
exemplifies the means by which ethnic nationalism affects migration policy.  
 According to the FMS, only 36,000 individuals participated in resettlement in 2013 
(FMS, 2013). Such low numbers can be attributed to the realities of the program: while 
                                                 
19
 Including reimbursement for moving expenses and up to six months living expenses. 
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 The Federal Law on Russian Federation Citizenship and Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation and 
The Federal Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation, signed into law on 4/21 and 5/08 
(respectively). 
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incentivized, individuals are resettled in target regions, often less-than-desirable locales (Iontsev 
& Ivakhnyuk, 2012). Expatriates, in particular, are unlikely to take advantage of situations that 
significantly reduce their standard of living, and subject their foreign earnings to Russian 
appropriation.  
6.2 Migration Infrastructure (Section III, 24, b) 
 Ostensibly, this segment of the SMPRF outlines procedures that would improve 
conditions for migrants by providing a modern infrastructure comprised of policy initiatives 
supporting the increased flow of migrant labor of all types into Russia. In recognition of this, the 
document suggests that the manner in which yearly quotas for migrant labor are determined 
would be improved to better reflect the needs of the labor market. In addition, this portion of the 
SMPRF outlines the creation of a seasonal labor as a distinct category of labor migration. In a 
reiteration of the compatriot portion, this section of the SMPRF is deliberate in identifying 
desired categories of individuals: entrepreneurs, skilled workers, and highly qualified specialists 
all make the list of professions likely to receive preferential treatment from the Russian 
government – again setting conditions that would limit migrants from Central Asia.  
 Notably, of the 16 migration-related laws passed since the approval of the SMPRF, only 
one law relates to building the migration infrastructure, an amendment that allows Russian-based 
shipping companies to hire foreign nationals for up to one year without requiring a work permit. 
As such, migration infrastructure remains under developed, contributing to the perpetuation of 
irregular migrants working without a permit and living in Russia without residence permits. 
Reformation of the quota system – perhaps the most useful and easily implemented policy goal – 
has yet to be achieved. In five years, the number of quotas has steadily declined; the last two 
years, in particular, correlate with Putin’s return to the presidency. Allowing quotas to directly 
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match employer needs and removing bureaucratic obstacles to procuring a work permit would 
substantially reduce the number of irregular migrants; however, inasmuch as Putin’s embrace of 
ethnic nationalism has maintained his power base, it has further limited the ability to reform the 
quota system despite official recognition of the importance of doing so. The disconnect between 
policy and reality occurs due to a lack of impartial assessment of irregular migration (Iontsev & 
Ivakhnyuk, 2013), a condition made possible by the vertical power structure coalesced under 
Putin. It is possible, then, for Putin to echo the assessment of the collective of pro-migrant 
Russians through public statements and proclamations while at the same time placating his 
power base by maintaining the status quo.  
6.3 Integration Assistance (Section III, 24, f) 
 Promoting greater integration of migrant groups was aimed at eliminating the ethnic 
enclaves that have developed as a result of inadequate migration infrastructure. This section 
contains a number of broad directives, including the promotion of Russian language and culture 
abroad; combating social exclusion of migrants, spatial segregation, and the formation of ethnic 
enclaves; and the creation of programs to build constructive interaction between migrants and the 
host community. A number of highly specific recommendations are also made, including the 
creation of a television channel dedicated to migrant integration and the establishment of Russian 
language and legal education programs.  
 Regarding the broad recommendations, the question of implementation remains. 
Promoting the Russian culture and language is a difficult task – particularly in the near-abroad 
where the memory of totalitarian Soviet rule is colored by Russian language and culture being 
forced upon unwilling recipients. More possible would be the creation of programs and 
initiatives supporting integration; however, this is rarely conducted through the state alone, and 
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more often conducted via partnering with civil society – notoriously weak in Russia. While the 
IOM has worked in this area and is sanctioned by the government, conditions for international 
NGOs have become increasingly difficult since the passage of the Foreign Agent Law in 2012, 
which subjects NGOs to heightened oversight by the Russian government in an effort to prevent 
foreign interference in local politics (BBC, 2012). While this law has yet to affect the work of 
IOM, its presence adds a layer of bureaucracy and mistrust to already difficult working 
conditions. Moreover, a local NGO is likely to be more effective than an international NGO, due 
to increased public buy-in afforded by proximity to and familiarity with migrants and migrant 
neighborhoods. Ideally, these local NGOS would employ individuals from local migrant 
populations, further increasing their trust amongst migrant groups. The implementation of the 
specific recommendations is equally questionable. The provision for creating a television 
channel with sole mission to promote migrant integration into the Russian culture via educational 
programming is curious for a number of reasons. First, delineating a specific channel for such 
programming puts the onus on migrants to integrate, whereas large scale programming 
promoting broad acceptance of migrant groups would reach society writ large. This suggests the 
influence of ethnic nationalism. Second, Russian television is largely state controlled and tends 
to offer programming sympathetic to the Russian government; programming that has been 
increasingly hostile towards migrant groups in recent years (Mukomel, 2013). Expecting migrant 
groups to trust programming encouraging the adoption of Russian customs on one channel while 
being simultaneously berated for the downfall of Russian civilization on another channel belies 
rational thought.  
 6.4: Illegal Migration (Section III, 24, g) 
 The advent of ethnic nationalism – as encouraged by the current political regime – has 
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transformed the topic of labor migration from a concept assisting the development of Russia to a 
problem that needs to be solved (Iontsev & Ivakhnyuk, 2013). Solutions to this problem in the 
SMPRF overwhelmingly concern measures related to increased securitization of the Russian 
Federation. Provisions increasing the penalties for violating migration legislation and increasing 
state controls on migration dominate this section, with each successive recommendation 
essentially building upon the preceding recommendation. Given that 50% of migration related 
laws passed after the SMPRF are related to combatting illegal migration, there are few questions 
surrounding implementation of these recommendations. Rather, the SMPRF is detached from 
reality due to the lack of recognition of the visa-free requirement for CIS countries as the cause 
of irregular migration.  
 Such incongruence is exhibited in the laws enacted post-SMPRF. Requiring that migrants 
speak Russian and are HIV-free sounds draconian and potentially restrictive until one realizes 
that these requirements only come into effect if a migrant applies for a work permit with the 
FMS. As previously stated, the layers of bureaucracy and existence of a robust labor market 
currently pushes many migrants from legal registration. Furthermore, an irregular migrant 
lacking proficiency in the Russian language can turn to the diaspora for assistance. An obvious 
solution would be eliminating the visa-free status for CIS countries; a solution promoted by more 
vehement nationalist parties. However, this solution is beset by a number of problems. Primarily, 
a visa-regime would require Russia to create corresponding infrastructure for processing visas 
(Golunov, 2014) – a significant cost and burden to an economy already facing a recession in 
2015. Additionally, upsetting the status quo in CIS countries – particularly those in Central Asia 
– could provide additional impetus to look east towards China, a condition that would affect 
Russian ambitions for the creation of a Eurasian Customs Union. Finally, a visa regime would 
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essentially trap irregular migrants in Russia, fearing the difficulties that a visa would present in 
reentering Russia (Golunov, 2014). With no place to go, and no means to apply for a work 
permit, these migrants would remain trapped in the gray labor market Russia was trying to 
eliminate.  
7. Potential Consequences 
 The failure of the SMPRF to adequately reform migration policy is the continuation of a 
policy direction that foments ethnic nationalism as means to distract the Russian public from 
systemic failures. In a manner similar to Russia’s use of the West as a means to define itself on a 
global stage, the current government takes a combative approach to migrant groups to define 
Russian for a domestic audience; an audience facing economic stagnation and extreme wealth 
disparity. Migrant groups serve as a convenient scapegoat for the ills of society, and increasing 
restrictions on migration provides an illusion of progress that obscures a bleak economic future. 
The reduction of irregular labor by aligning the quotas with the needs of the labor market and 
simplifying the procedure for both work permits and temporary residency would provide 
additional tax revenue projected at $3.8 billion (IOM, 2009). Ignoring this fact exponentially 
increases the effects of the looming demographic crisis.  
 An additional consequence involves the rise of far-right nationalism and the xenophobia 
that surrounds this rise. Fomenting discord towards migrants serves short-term political goals but 
has long-term consequences: every riot or incident damages the stability that Putin routinely 
campaigns on. Furthermore, the rise of charismatic anti-Putin nationalists further jeopardizes 
Putin’s power by providing a legitimate alternative whose actions are increasingly more in tune 
with the public. One such candidate is Aleksei Navalny, whose popularity rests on fighting 
corruption and opposition to migrants and migration. Navalny’s popularity has already affected 
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Russian politics: the hallmark of his 2013 campaign for mayor of Moscow was opposition to the 
Islamization of Moscow, which, according to Navalny, is a leading cause of crime and terror in 
Moscow and is a direct result of Putin’s “open-border” policy (Judah, 2013). As such, each 
candidate – including the liberal party candidate – proposed measures against irregular migrants. 
A prolonged recession jeopardizing the livelihood of the middle class will only further the 
legitimacy of an opposition candidate such as Navalny.  
8. Conclusion 
The challenges of reforming Russian migration policy are unlikely to abate in the near 
future. In the short-term, migrant groups will continue to suffer from working at the margins of 
Russian society; in the long-term, ethnic Russians should anticipate a further reduction in their 
standard of living resulting from a lack of meaningful reform to migration policy – reform that 
could provide a sustainable labor force and tax base in line with future needs. Solving the crisis 
requires an accurate assessment of labor needs independent of ethnic nationalist rhetoric. Given 
the importance of ethnic nationalism to the current political regime, such an assessment is 
unlikely and will further limit opportunities for meaningful reform.  
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Appendix a: Section III of the State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation to 2025. 
III. Objectives, principles, objectives and main directions of the State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation 
21. The objectives of the state migration policy of the Russian Federation: 
a) National security of the Russian Federation, the maximum protection, comfort and well-being of the population of 
the Russian Federation; 
b) Stabilization and increase in the resident population of the Russian Federation; 
c) Promote the needs of the Russian economy in the workforce, modernization, innovation development and 
enhancing the competitiveness of its industries. 
22. The principles of the state migration policy of the Russian Federation: 
a) Ensuring the rights and freedoms of man and citizen; 
b) Prohibition of all forms of discrimination; 
c) Compliance with national and international law; 
d) Harmonization of the interests of individuals, society and the state; 
e) Reacting the federal authorities, state authorities of the Russian Federation and local governments, the 
development of institutions of social partnership and civil society; 
f) Protection of the national labor market; 
g) A differentiated approach to the management of migration flows, depending on the purpose and duration of stay, 
socio-demographic and professional qualifications of workers; 
h) Account of the special regional development; the openness and accessibility of information on migration 
processes and decisions in the implementation of the state migration policy of the Russian Federation; 
i) Scientific validity of decisions. 
23. The objectives of the state migration policy of the Russian Federation: 
a) The creation of conditions and incentives for the relocation of the Russian Federation for permanent residence 
compatriots living abroad, emigrants and certain categories of foreign nationals; 
b) Development of differentiated mechanisms of attraction, selection and use of foreign labor; 
c) Promotion of internal migration; 
d) To promote educational migration and support academic mobility; 
e) Implementation of humanitarian obligations in respect of forced migrants; 
f) To promote the adaptation and integration of migrants, the formation of constructive interaction between migrants 
and the host community; 
g) Illegal migration. 
24. The main directions of the State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation: 
a) In the development of our compatriots living abroad, emigrants and certain categories of foreign nationals 
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conditions and incentives for the relocation of the Russian Federation for permanent residence: 
● Promotion of voluntary resettlement to the Russian Federation of compatriots living abroad and returning 
emigrants; 
● Implementation of the State program to assist the voluntary resettlement to the Russian Federation of 
compatriots living abroad, its modernization and giving it a perpetual nature; 
● Resettlement assistance for permanent residence of qualified professionals as well as other foreign workers 
in demand in the Russian labor market; 
● Creating conditions for migration to the Russian Federation entrepreneurs and investors; 
● Resettlement assistance to the Russian Federation of foreign citizens in the purpose of family reunification; 
● encouraging migration to the Russian Federation of young people with special demand on the Russian labor 
market professions and specialties, including the provision of preferences in obtaining a residence permit 
graduates of Russian educational institutions of vocational education from the foreign nationals who 
acquire a profession (specialty), demand on the labor market of the Russian Federation; 
● Modernization of institutions, a temporary residence permit and residence permit; 
● The creation of a points system for the selection of migrants they receive a residence permit; 
● the introduction of fast (simplified) procedure for obtaining Russian citizenship by persons with a residence 
permit and are entrepreneurs, investors, professionals, and members of their families, as well as graduates 
of Russian educational institutions of vocational education; 
b) In the development of differentiated mechanisms of attraction, selection and use of foreign labor, 
demanded the Russian economy: 
● Establish effective mechanisms for assessing the need for foreign labor from the perspectives of 
development of the economy and national labor market; 
● Improving the mechanism of quotas and other regulatory instruments to attract foreign labor; 
● Creation of differentiated programs of short-term and long-term labor migration, including the use of 
various mechanisms of selection, conditions of entry, stay and labor activity, including: 
● Programs to attract highly qualified specialists and skilled workers in occupations in short supply and 
demand in the Russian labor market; 
● Programs organized by attracting foreign workers; seasonal programs 
● Migration of labor migration and the vacation of foreign students; 
● Infrastructure development in the field of labor migration on the basis of cooperation between public, 
private and non-profit organizations; 
● The creation of mechanisms to encourage foreign workers in demand in the Russian labor market, to 
conclude long-term employment contracts and obtain the status of permanent residents in the Russian 
Federation; 
● Simplification of the rules of entry and residence in the territory of the Russian Federation, foreign citizens 
arriving for business purposes; 
● Simplification of entry and removal of restrictions for employment and training of family members of 
foreign workers who have signed long-term employment contracts; 
● The creation of a mechanism to attract foreign workers for jobs that cannot replace the Russian workers; 
● Improve the mechanism for foreign citizens to work on the basis of patents; 
● Simplification of entry, exit and stay on the territory of the Russian Federation of foreign citizens involved 
in investment and entrepreneurship; 
● Simplification of entry, exit and stay on the territory of the Russian Federation, foreign citizens who are 
employees of accredited in accordance with established procedure in the Russian Federation representative 
offices of foreign legal entities registered in the Russian Federation in accordance with legislation of the 
Russian Federation; 
● Improving the system of issuing permits for employment; 
● The establishment of centers to promote immigration to the Russian Federation and the medical 
examination of immigrants, including abroad; 
c) To promote the development of the internal migration of citizens of the Russian Federation: 
● Simplification of procedures for registration of citizens of the Russian Federation for the purpose of 
removing administrative barriers to change the place of stay or residence; 
● Ensuring citizens' access to social, medical and other types of services at the place of actual residence; 
● Informing the public about employment opportunities at moving to another location; 
Skapyak 41 
 
● development of various forms of temporary spatial mobility for employment purposes, including the spread 
of shift work practices, flexible forms of employment and flexible working hours; 
● Educational support (training) migration of Russian citizens, including for the purpose of education and 
training for occupations that are in demand in the labor market; 
● Promoting local internal migration, especially between regional centers, small towns and rural settlements; 
● Infrastructure for accommodation and training of internal labor migrants on the basis of public-private 
partnerships; 
● Support regions and territories, conducting active measures to attract domestic workers, including in the 
framework of federal programs; 
● Development of cheap rental housing market segments; 
● Development of cooperation between state employment centers with private agencies for employment of 
citizens of the Russian Federation outside the territory of their permanent residence; 
● Improvement of the federal and regional banks vacancies, regional and interregional information exchange 
systems on employment opportunities in order to increase citizens' awareness of the possibilities and 
conditions of employment; 
● The establishment of funds for implementation of incentive measures to move people to work in other 
regions, including regions of the Far East; 
● increase the investment attractiveness of the Far East, Siberia, and strategically important border areas in 
order to create the necessary for the relocation of social and transport infrastructure, as well as reducing 
transport detachment from the regions of Central Russia; 
● Development of transport infrastructure, internal and inter-regional passenger transport; 
● Subsidization of passenger traffic between the regions of eastern and western parts of the country; 
d) To promote educational (training) migration to the Russian Federation and support academic mobility: 
● Improving the learning environment in the Russian educational institutions at different levels of training of 
Russian and foreign students, regardless of their nationality or place of residence; 
● Increase the number of students in institutions of higher and secondary vocational education of the number 
of foreign nationals, mostly citizens of the states - members of the Commonwealth of Independent States; 
● Improving the conditions of stay in the Russian Federation, foreign students, their socio-cultural 
adjustment, health insurance, safety; 
● Russian export of educational services in the country - the sources of mass migration to the Russian 
Federation; 
● Facilitate the mobility of professionals involved in teaching, research and expert-analytical work in 
educational institutions and scientific organizations; 
● Organizational, informational and financial assistance to educational institutions and scientific 
organizations in the implementation of programs of international academic mobility and to attract foreign 
scientists on the basis of long-term employment contracts; 
● Provision of foreign students studying in the Russian Federation, the right to engage in employment during 
the training period on the same basis as the Russian students; 
● Enabling foreign nationals to work in the profession in the Russian Federation immediately after the 
completion of training at Russian institutions of higher and secondary vocational education; 
● The creation of centers of Pre-study of the Russian language in educational institutions of primary 
vocational education in the countries with the most intense migratory flows; 
● simplification of administrative procedures related to the entry and stay in the territory of the Russian 
Federation of foreign nationals for the purpose of teaching, research and expert-analytical work in 
educational institutions and research organizations, including participation in conferences and seminars; 
● the introduction of a simplified procedure for obtaining foreign nationals to enter the territory of the 
Russian Federation for the purpose of teaching, research and expert-analytical work in educational 
institutions and research organizations, and members of their families residing in the status of the Russian 
Federation; 
● Simplification of entry of family members of foreign nationals who had arrived with the aim of teaching, 
research and expert-analytical work in educational institutions and research organizations, and the removal 
of restrictions of their employment and training; 
● Development of a system of grants to citizens of the Russian Federation, received professional training 
abroad, in order to facilitate their return; 
● Assist compatriots, including their children, living abroad for education in the Russian Federation; 
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● Development of the minimum required range of services for health insurance for foreign students in 
educational institutions of the Russian Federation; 
e) In the implementation of humanitarian obligations in respect of forced migrants: 
● Create favorable conditions for socio-economic and socio-cultural integration of forced migrants, the 
constitutional rights and freedoms of man and citizen; 
● Fulfillment of state obligations of resettlement of persons having the status of internally displaced persons; 
● Improving the asylum system; 
● The creation of regional and interregional information exchange systems work with forced migrants; 
● Facilitating the voluntary return of refugees, persons granted asylum and applicants for the corresponding 
status in the country of their former homes, as well as resettlement in third countries; 
● Provision of forced migrants complete and objective information about the situation in countries and 
regions of their former residence, the safety of the voluntary return to their former homes; 
● Maintenance of infrastructure facilities for the accommodation of forced migrants; 
● Development of programs of social support forced migrants; 
f) To promote the adaptation and integration of migrants, the formation of constructive interaction between 
migrants and the host community: 
● Promote the development of culture in society interethnic and interreligious relations, the formation of 
migrants and the host community intercultural skills, combating xenophobia, national and racial 
intolerance; 
● Creating conditions for the adaptation and integration of migrants, including Russian language courses, 
legal education, information about cultural traditions and norms of behavior by establishing the appropriate 
infrastructure in their countries of origin and in the Russian regions experiencing the greatest influx of 
migrants, as well as actively using the potential of the media information and opportunities for cultural 
adaptation centers in the countries of origin; 
● Access of foreign nationals and their family members to social, health and education services according to 
their legal status; 
● Promotion of Russian language and culture abroad; 
● Combating social exclusion of migrants, spatial segregation and the formation of ethnic enclaves; 
● development, introduction and implementation of programs of adaptation and integration of migrants and 
their families in the Russian Federation on the basis of the interaction of federal authorities, state authorities 
of the Russian Federation and local governments, civil society and business structures; 
● the creation of infrastructure for the promotion of adaptation and integration, including information centers 
and legal support workers, language courses, history and culture of the Russian Federation, as well as the 
creation of a dedicated channel and television cycles focused on the socio-cultural and linguistic adaptation 
of migrants; 
● The creation of programs to build constructive interaction between migrants and the host community; 
● Improving the interaction between federal authorities, state authorities of the Russian Federation and local 
governments with public associations that contribute to adaptation and integration of migrants; 
g) In the field of combating illegal migration: 
● Improving the legal framework of combating illegal migration; 
● Improvement of sanctions for violation of the migration legislation of the Russian Federation; 
● The creation and improvement of the system of immigration control by fixing this concept in the system of 
normative legal acts of the Russian Federation, the definition of competent authorities and a list of relevant 
authorities; 
● Improving the system of state control of entry and stay of foreign citizens in the Russian Federation; 
● Opposition organization channels of illegal migration, including by increasing the security of passports and 
visas and other documents that could identify the person; 
● The creation of infrastructure for the implementation of readmission procedures and ensuring public 
authorities of the Russian Federation functioning of special institutions for the maintenance of foreign 
citizens and stateless persons subject to administrative expulsion or deportation; 
● Improvement of inter-agency cooperation, including the exchange of information at the national level, as 
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well as with the competent authorities of foreign countries on combating illegal migration; 
● Development and adoption of a program to combat illegal migration, joint interstate preventive operations; 
● Increased information and outreach to citizens, employers in order to prevent violations of migration 
legislation of the Russian Federation. 
 
Appendix b: Migration Laws passed subsequent to the adoption of the State Migration 
Policy of the Russian Federation to 2025. 
 
Policy Target 
Area Description Date 
Amendments to Article 25 of the 
Federal Law On the Exit from and 
Entry into the Russian Federation 
 
The Law aims to improve Russia’s migration legislation by 
introducing a common set of rules regarding simplified visa 
procedures or visa exemptions for foreign citizens entering 
Russia in accordance with the Russian Federation’s 
international agreements 
11/13/201
2 
Amendments to Article 131 of the 
Federal Law On the Legal Status of 
Foreign Citizens in the Russian 
Federation and Article 272 of the Law 
On Education 
 
The federal law is aimed at improving Russian legislation 
on labor migration with regard to the employment of 
foreign nationals and stateless persons in Russia in housing 
and utilities, market trade and services sectors. The Federal 
Law On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian 
Federation has been supplemented with provisions requiring 
a person applying for a work permit or its renewal and 
arriving in Russia on a visa-free basis to present a state 
examination certificate in the Russian language. 
Amendments to the Federal Law On Education require a 
foreign national or a stateless person to provide documents 
or certificates confirming their knowledge of Russian 
language at the relevant level. 
11/14/201
2 
Amendments to Federal Law On the 
Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in 
the Russian Federation and Article 
18.9 and 28.3 of the Code of 
Administrative Offences of the 
Russian Federation. 
 
The law provides social guarantees to migrant workers and 
imposes administrative responsibility of the inviting party 
for failing to provide material support, healthcare and 
housing to the visiting foreign citizen or stateless person 
during his or her stay in Russia. 
1/3/2013 
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Amendments to Federal Law On the 
Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in 
the Russian Federation 
 
The federal law authorizes shipping companies to hire 
foreign nationals for a 1-year term without a work permit.  1/3/2013 
Amendments to Article 3221 of the 
Criminal Code of the Russian 
Federation. 
 
The federal law increases criminal responsibility for 
organizing illegal entry into Russia of foreign citizens and 
stateless persons, their illegal stay in Russia or illegal transit 
through the Russian territory. 
1/3/2013 
Federal Law On the Legal Status of 
Foreign Citizens in the Russian 
Federation 
 
The Federal Law regulates procedural matters related to 
establishing the identity of foreign citizens requesting to be 
granted Russian citizenship or recognized as Russian 
citizens 
5/8/2013 
Amendments to Article 16 of the 
Federal Law On Russian Federation 
Citizenship 
 
A list of the main grounds for rejecting applications for 
obtaining or regaining Russian Federation citizenship has 
been added to the Federal Law 
11/4/2013 
Amendments to the Federal Law On 
the Exit from and Entry into the 
Russian Federation 
 
The Federal Law will improve Russian legislation with 
regard to ensuring greater protection of Russian passports 
outside Russia. In accordance with the amendments, 
electronically stored information in passports that Russian 
citizens use to certify their identity when abroad, will now 
contain additional biometric data on the individual (an 
electronic image of two fingerprints). The scanned 
fingerprint images will be stored only on the electronic chip 
in the passport and once the passport has been issued will be 
deleted from the information systems concerned. 
12/23/201
3 
Amendments to Article 27 of the 
Federal Law On the Exit from and 
Entry into the Russian Federation and 
Article 5 of the Federal Law On the 
Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in 
the Russian Federation 
 
The Federal Law is aimed at streamlining the legal regime 
regulating temporary stay in Russia of foreign citizens and 
stateless persons arriving in Russia in a manner not 
requiring a visa. The amendment introduced by the Federal 
Law limits the continuous temporary stay in Russia of 
foreign citizens who have the right to enter Russia in a 
manner not requiring a visa, to 90 days out of every 180 
days 
12/30/201
3 
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Amendments to Federal Law On the 
Legal Status of Foreign Nationals in 
the Russian Federation and Individual 
Legislative Acts of the Russian 
Federation 
 
The federal law is aimed at improving the Russian 
Federation’s migration legislation. The amendments 
concern medical examination procedures for foreign 
nationals arriving in Russia under conditions that do not 
require a visa, who are working on Russian territory for 
private individuals or studying in Russia full time. The 
amendments establish that when such foreign nationals 
apply for work permits (licenses) in the Russian Federation, 
they are required to present documents stating that they are 
free of drug addiction and illnesses indicated on the 
corresponding official list of infectious diseases that pose a 
threat to those around them, as well as a certificate stating 
that they are not infected with HIV. In accordance with the 
federal law, failure to present the indicated documents 
serves as a basis for refusing to issue (or extend) a work 
permit or license to a foreign national. 
12/30/201
3 
Amendments to Federal Law On the 
Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in 
the Russian Federation. 
 
The Federal Law is designed to improve legislation 
regulating migration in the Russian Federation regarding the 
introduction of mandatory documents proving the 
knowledge of the Russian language, history and basic 
legislation of the Russian Federation for citizens of other 
countries applying for temporary or permanent residence 
permit, work permits or patents, except for highly qualified 
experts. 
4/21/2014 
Amendments to the Federal Law On 
Russian Federation Citizenship and 
Certain Legislative Acts of the 
Russian Federation 
 
The federal law sets simplified procedures for granting 
Russian Federation citizenship to foreign citizens and 
stateless persons living on Russian territory and recognized 
as Russian-speakers. 
4/21/2014 
Amendments to Article 13 of the 
Federal Law on the Legal Status of 
Foreign Citizens in the Russian 
Federation 
 
The Federal Law is aimed at improving Russia’s migration 
legislation as regards labor activities in Russia by foreign 
citizens recognized as refugees or having received 
temporary refugee status in accordance with the Federal 
Law On Refugees. 
5/5/2014 
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Amendments to Federal Law On the 
Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in 
the Russian Federation and Individual 
Legislative Acts of the Russian 
Federation to Create Additional 
Favorable Conditions for Foreign 
Citizens and Stateless Persons 
Studying in the Russian Federation. 
 
The Amendments create the opportunity for foreign citizens 
to combine work and study in Russia, grants special rights 
to foreign students wishing to work in Russia, creates 
additional education opportunities for migrant workers in 
Russia, and provides Russian compatriots the opportunity to 
study at Russian educational institutions. 
6/24/2014 
Amendments to Certain Legislative 
Acts of the Russian Federation to 
Improve the Russian Federation 
Legislation on Special Migration 
Institutions 
 
The Federal Law is aimed at improving the Russian 
Federation migration legislation concerning statutory 
regulation of issues of detaining foreign nationals and 
stateless persons subject to administrative expulsion from 
the Russian Federation, deportation or readmission, in 
special facilities of the Russian Federal Migration Service 
(FMS). To this end, the Federal Law amends the Federal 
Law On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian 
Federation establishing procedures for detaining foreign 
citizens and stateless persons in Russian FMS facilities 
subject to administrative expulsion from the Russian 
Federation, deportation or readmission, and establishes that 
the list of federal executive migration officials, as well as 
their territorial agencies, empowered to make decisions on 
deportation or readmission, is to be approved by this federal 
agency. Furthermore, the Federal Law introduces 
administrative liability of foreign citizens and stateless 
persons for administrative offenses committed during their 
stay in special Russian FMS facilities, and specifies 
procedures for civil proceedings in cases arising from said 
legal relations. 
7/23/2014 
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Amendments to particular Russian 
Federation Laws and Statutes in order 
to Improve Immigration Law and the 
Penalties for its Violation 
 
The amendments aim to improve Russia’s immigration laws 
regarding prevention of illegal immigration and tougher 
penalties for violating the laws in this area. Amendments to 
the Federal Law On Entering and Exiting the Russian 
Federation make it possible in specific cases to refuse 
foreign citizens or stateless persons entry to Russia. An 
amendment regarding work permits for foreign citizens has 
been made to the Federal Law On the Legal Status of 
Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation. Amendments to 
the Russian Federation Administrative Offences Code 
toughen the administrative penalties for violation by foreign 
citizens or stateless persons of the rules for entry into 
Russia, staying on Russian territory, and working illegally 
in Russia. Administrative penalties have also been 
toughened for giving false information to the migration 
registration authorities, and for evading administrative 
penalties. 
7/26/2014 
 
 
 
 
